Fabricated aviation emergencies betray a global trust — Shahrul Mizan Ismail

OCTOBER 4 — In aviation, a lie can become an operational hazard. False information can alter a pilot's decisions, mobilise rescue services and trigger security responses with consequences for human life. Fabricating a crash or staging a hijacking therefore raises a question more serious than whether a stunt is offensive: has deception crossed the threshold into unlawful endangerment?

International law provides important answers, but precision matters. A false social-media announcement is not legally identical to a fabricated threat communicated to a flight crew. An authorised emergency exercise is different from deceiving aviation authorities. The absence of deaths does not establish innocence, just as public outrage does not establish every element of an offence. — AFP pic

International law provides important answers, but precision matters. A false social-media announcement is not legally identical to a fabricated threat communicated to a flight crew. An authorised emergency exercise is different from deceiving aviation authorities. The absence of deaths does not establish innocence, just as public outrage does not establish every element of an offence.

Article 1(1)(e) of the 1971 Montreal Convention directly addresses someone who unlawfully and intentionally communicates information they know to be false, thereby endangering an aircraft in flight. A crash is not required. Knowledge of falsity and the resulting danger to the aircraft are central. ^[1]

The distinction matters. A fabricated bomb warning can have legal consequences even when the aircraft lands safely. Conversely, an honestly reported concern that proves unfounded is not automatically a deliberate falsehood. Passenger distress alone cannot substitute for evidence of the danger required by this provision.

Hijacking requires a separate analysis. Under the 1970 Hague Convention, the core offence involves someone aboard an aircraft in flight unlawfully seizing or exercising control through force, threats of force or intimidation. An imaginary bomb can therefore support a real hijacking if the threat achieves the unlawful seizure of control. ^[2]

But a performance during which the pilot retains lawful control does not automatically establish that offence merely because passengers were deceived. Other offences may still arise. The 2010 Beijing Protocol broadens the framework, including technological means and specified threats made in circumstances indicating credibility. Treaty participation and the date of the conduct determine which framework applies. ^[3]

False distress communications also deserve attention. Article 47 of the International Telecommunication Union Constitution requires member states to take steps to prevent false or deceptive distress, urgency, safety or identification signals. Radio Regulations provision 15.1 prohibits false or misleading transmissions. A fabricated crash report accompanied by a false distress signal may therefore engage obligations beyond the hijacking conventions. ^[4]

State involvement makes the stakes greater. Article 4 of the Chicago Convention commits contracting states not to use civil aviation for purposes inconsistent with the convention's aims. Sovereignty over airspace carries responsibilities; it cannot itself legitimise manufacturing a threat for political advantage. ^[5]

The diversion of Ryanair Flight FR4978 to Minsk on 23 May 2021 supplies a documented institutional example. ICAO Assembly Resolution A41-1 records the Council's determination that senior Belarusian government officials knowingly participated in, or were involved in, supplying information about a false bomb threat that led to the diversion. ^[6]

The Assembly endorsed the determination that the government's actions deliberately endangered the aircraft and those aboard, amounting to a flagrant and serious violation of Article 4. This demonstrates the international consequences of a fabricated threat without a crash. It must, however, be distinguished from a criminal conviction of any particular individual.

State responsibility and individual criminal liability are separate questions. The International Law Commission's articles on state responsibility provide a framework for asking whether conduct is attributable to a state and breaches its international obligations. State organs, delegated governmental authority, instructions and control can be relevant. Political benefit alone does not prove attribution. ^[7]

If an aviation incident is fabricated to blame another country and justify military action, the United Nations Charter's prohibition on the use of force also becomes relevant. Applying its principles, a state cannot manufacture a right of self-defence from an attack it knows never occurred. A false narrative cannot supply the missing factual basis. ^[8]

During armed conflict, international humanitarian law distinguishes permissible ruses from perfidy. Article 37 of Additional Protocol I prohibits killing, injuring or capturing an adversary through betrayal of confidence in protection afforded by that law. Not every deception meets those requirements. Calling conduct a war crime requires proof of the relevant context and elements. ^[9]

The practical response should combine institutional resolve with fair process. Investigators need preserved communications, crew testimony, flight data and a reconstruction of operational decisions. Alleged state involvement requires careful examination of instructions and institutional links. Authorities must establish jurisdiction and the applicable domestic implementing law, rather than assume that every treaty permits every country to prosecute every incident.

The same evidential discipline must govern accusations that a disaster was staged. Incomplete footage, early inconsistencies or unanswered questions do not themselves establish a conspiracy. Demanding a credible explanation is legitimate. Converting uncertainty into an unsupported allegation damages the very public trust that accountability is supposed to protect.

Aviation depends on people treating emergency information as a responsibility. Deliberately exploiting that trust warrants consequences where the legal elements are proved. International law earns its authority by protecting life firmly and assessing accusations fairly. The trust that allows humanity to cross the skies must never become a prop in somebody else's performance.

*This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.